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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9287

INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T AMMAN 002322

SIPDIS

NOFORN SIPDIS

S/CT FOR WORMAN AND HAWTHORNE NEA FOR OLSON AND EVANS EB/ESC/TSF FOR SALOOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2015

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC CG XA XF XG XI JO

SUBJECT: FOREIGN FIGHTER DEMARCHE

REF: A. STATE 35709

¶B. AMMAN 2118

¶C. JICCENT 20150804

1D. JICCENT 20070120

¶E. JICCENT 20051030

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 b and d.

11. (C) Polcouns made Ref A points on foreign fighters in a March 9 meeting with Dimai Haddad, head of Foreign Minister Khatib's private office. Haddad said the GOJ views it as in its own interest to stop any young men, Jordanian or foreign, who fit the foreign fighter profile. He pointed to Jordan's successes in prosecuting and preventing would-be jihadis from crossing into Syria and Iraq. COMMENT: Haddad was referring to several on-going prosecutions for recruiting fighters and for border infiltration (ref B). END COMMENT. Post's responses to ref A queries follow.

ENHANCED COLLECTION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING

- 12. (S/NF) In July 2005, the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) formed a new branch in its Counterterrorism Directorate to uncover and disrupt activity in Jordan that supports the Iraqi insurgency. The new Iraqi Insurgency Branch includes 11 staff officers; a lieutenant colonel who formerly headed GID's Surveillance Unit leads it (ref C.)
- 13. (S/NF) Embassy Amman, through its SIMO and RSO offices, enjoys an excellent relationship with GID and the Public Security Directorate (PSD), and receives timely and relevant intelligence information. The GID has a long history of cooperating with the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts and has arrested numerous suspected terrorist operatives.

BORDER SECURITY

- 14. (S/NF) Since the November 2005 hotel bombings and the August 2005 Aqaba rocket attacks, Jordan has significantly stepped up its efforts to prevent the movement of extremists to and from Iraq and Syria. In late 2005, the GID deployed its Alien Border Control System (ABCS) at Queen Alia International Airport and several border checkpoints. Using passport scanners, the ABCS compares identities against the GID's no-travel lists. NOTE: The ABCS is also fully operational at the Trebil/Karama border crossing with Iraq. END NOTE. The GID is also working on integrating biometric data into the ABCS system to assist in the rapid, positive identification of individuals (refs C, D.)
- 15. (S/NF) GID asserts that its primary problem in securing the Iraq-Jordan border is forged and/or fraudulent Iraqi travel documents, and ineffective Iraqi screening at Trebil/Karama, the only official border crossing between Iraq

and Jordan. GID assesses that approximately 4,000 Iraqis attempt to enter Jordan each day; of these 1,000 - 1,300 are denied entry.

16. (S) Jordan does not require Iraqis to obtain Jordanian visas before presenting themselves at a Jordanian point of entry. Applicants for entry must satisfy border officials that they intend to enter for a bona fide temporary visit. GOJ officials typically grant bearers of Iraqi passports permission to enter Jordan for 15-day visits; however, many of those allowed entry overstay. Jordanian border officials tell the U.S. military,s Civil Affairs Liaison Team (CALT), which is attached to Embassy Amman, that they often turn away Iraqis bearing fake passports only to see the same Iraqis bearing newly forged passports later the same day.

TRAVEL SCRUTINY

17. (C) Jordanian border officials tell CALT and emboffs that they are not allowing travelers to cross into Iraq unless the travelers can prove that they are either a Jordanian with relatives in Iraq; associated with an NGO operating in Iraq; or working for a company that transports goods into Iraq. GID screens all those seeking entry into Iraq for links to criminal activity or terrorism.